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Abstract 
We investigate the allocation of unemployed individuals to different subprograms within Swiss 
active labour market policy by the caseworkers at local employment offices in Switzerland in 
1998. We are particularly interested in whether the caseworkers allocate the unemployed to 
services in ways that will maximize the program-induced changes in their employment 
probabilities. Our econometric analysis uses unusually informative data originating from 
administrative unemployment and social security records. For the estimation we apply matching 
estimators adapted to the case of multiple programmes. The number of observations in this 
database is sufficiently high to allow for this nonparametric analysis to be conducted in narrowly 
defined subgroups. Our results indicate that Swiss caseworkers do not do a very good job of 
allocating their unemployed clients to the subprograms so as to maximize their subsequent 
employment prospects. Our findings suggest one of three possible conclusions.  First, case-
workers may be trying to solve the problem of allocating the unemployed to maximize their 
subsequent employment, but may lack the skills or knowledge to do this.  Second, caseworkers 
may have a goal other than efficiency, such as allocating the most expensive services to the least 
well-off clients, that is not explicit in the law regulating active labour market policies.  Third, the 
distortions of the local decision process could be due to federal authorities imposing strict 
minimum participation requirements for the various programs at the regional level. 
Keywords 
Targeting, Statistical Profiling, Statistical Treatment Rule, Active Labour Market Policy, 
Caseworkers 
JEL classification: J68, H00 
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Introduction 
This paper considers the problem of how best to assign unemployed persons to one of a set of 
available employment and training programs.  Several different methods exist to do this.  The 
most common one consists of having the unemployed person meet with a caseworker.  Together, 
the unemployed person and the caseworker come to an agreement about the services that the 
person should receive based on the person's interests, the caseworker's evaluation of his or her 
capabilities and the availability of slots in particular programs in the local area.  Caseworker 
allocation is based on the idea that optimal assignment requires knowledge of the characteristics 
of the unemployed person, the local labour market and local service providers, combined with the 
presumed professional expertise of the caseworker. 
Three other allocation schemes have also been used in practice.  The first scheme consists 
of random assignment to services, a practice typically confined to experimental evaluations.  For 
example, in the Canadian Self-Sufficiency Project experiment, treated persons were randomly 
assigned to receive only a wage subsidy or both a wage subsidy and employment and training 
services.1 The second scheme consists of deterministic assignment, in which everyone in a 
particular status gets the same service.  For example, everyone on social assistance might be 
required to receive job search assistance.   
The third allocation scheme consists of using statistical treatment rules to assign persons 
to services (or to any service).  This scheme is sometimes called profiling or targeting.  It is 
presently used to assign unemployment insurance claimants in the United States to mandatory 
employment and training services.2  It is also being considered for use in combination with 
                                                          
1 See the description in Michalopoulos et al. (2002). 
2 See, e.g., Manski (2001), Black, Smith, Berger and Noel (2003) or Eberts, O’Leary and Wandner (2002). 
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caseworker assignment in the form of the Frontline Decision Support System for Workforce 
Investment Act (WIA) programs in the United States.   In its existing implementation in the U.S. 
unemployment insurance system, the profiling is based on a statistical prediction of each 
claimant's probability of benefit exhaustion or expected benefit receipt duration.  Claimants with 
higher predicted probabilities of exhaustion (or longer expected durations of benefit receipt) 
receive the mandatory services while those with lower predicted probabilities do not.  As 
discussed at length in Berger, Black and Smith (2000), this scheme assigns treatment based on 
the predicted outcome in the absence of treatment, rather than on the predicted impact of the 
treatment.  Assignment on the basis of outcomes rather than of impacts may serve equity goals 
(such as allocating the least employable among the unemployed to the most intensive services), 
but does not serve efficiency goals unless outcomes correlate negatively with impacts.   
In this paper, we consider the use of statistical treatment rules to assign treatments on the 
basis of their predicted impacts.  In particular, we use data on the Active Labour Market Policies 
(ALMPs) in place in Switzerland following their unemployment insurance reform in 1996 to 
examine the relative performance of alternative allocation rules.  We employ these Swiss data for 
four reasons.  First, the Swiss ALMPs include a wide variety of different treatments, of which we 
consider eight here.  This variety allows substantial scope for caseworker discretion in treatment 
assignment.  Second, the highly decentralized nature of the Swiss government means that 
caseworkers typically have substantial discretion to use their professional expertise in assigning 
persons to services.  Third, the rich data available in the Swiss context give credibility to the non-
experimental matching methods we use to generate our impact estimates.  Finally, the Swiss 
programs are similar enough in terms of design and services offered to those of other developed 
countries to make it credible to generalize our findings beyond the Swiss border. 
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The remainder of the paper develops as follows.  In Section 2, we describe the policy 
environment in Switzerland at the time our data were collected.  This includes a detailed 
description of the available employment and training programs.  Section 3 describes the existing 
caseworker assignment mechanism and the basic patterns of assignment to the various treatments.  
Section 4 outlines the matching methods used by Gerfin and Lechner (2002) to produce the 
impact estimates upon which part of our analysis builds.  Section 5 considers how well the 
existing caseworker allocation does at maximizing the mean impact of the employment and 
training services currently provided.  Following on the somewhat negative findings in Section 5, 
in Section 6 we estimate the mean impacts associated with some alternative allocation rules and 
find that some of them substantially outperform the caseworkers on this dimension.  In Section 7 
we make some concluding remarks. 
2. The Policy Environment 
Switzerland is unique among European countries in its low unemployment rates throughout much 
of the post-war period.  In the 1970s, the Swiss unemployment rate never exceeded one percent, 
and it did not exceed 1.1 percent in the 1980s.  In the 1990s, however, it began to rise to 
historically high levels, with a peak of 5.2 percent in 1997.  These historically high levels of 
unemployment, though still remarkably low by European standards, prompted the Swiss 
government to enact a series of unemployment law reforms and active labour market policies in 
the 1990s.   
Under the 1996 unemployment law reform in Switzerland, which is the one in place at the 
time our data were generated, individuals may be required to participate in employment and 
training services once they have been unemployed for 150 days (or 30 weeks) out of their two-
 4
year benefit entitlement.3  If they are requested to participate after the deadline and do not 
comply, then their benefits may be cut off.   The data, discussed in more detail in Section 3, 
indicate that some claimants participate in services before the deadline, while in other cases the 
deadline appears not to be enforced, perhaps because appropriate services were not immediately 
available. 
Table 1 describes the different employment and training services provided under the 
Swiss unemployment insurance reform in 1996 (and defines the abbreviations we use to identify 
them in the remaining tables).  There are three general categories: classroom training of various 
sorts, work experience in public and private sector jobs that are created specifically as part of the 
active labour market policy, and (partial) wage subsidies for temporary regular jobs in the private 
sector (where the latter may sometimes, but are not supposed to, substitute for permanent regular 
jobs).  The training courses offered under the Swiss ALMP do not include occupational retraining 
– only further training within the current occupation.  Courses last from one day to six months, 
but only courses at least two weeks in length are counted in our empirical work.  Employment 
programs typically last six months, although participants are required to continue their job search 
while participating and to accept appropriate offers.  Wages on the employment programs can in 
principle exceed the UI benefit level, but in practice usually do not.  Neither courses nor 
employment programs count toward further UI eligibility.  Temporary wage subsidies are not 
formally a part of the ALMP, but caseworkers appear to treat them as if they were.  We follow 
the caseworkers in doing so here.  Local placement offices arrange only about 20 percent of 
temporary wage subsidy placements, with the remainder arranged through employers or private 
temporary employment agencies.  The local placement office must confirm placements in the 
                                                          
3   The two-year entitlement is available to persons who contributed to the UI system in at least six of the past 24 
months.  After the two-year entitlement has been exhausted, obtaining a new entitlement requires 12 months of 
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latter category in order for them to receive the subsidy.  Time spent employed on a temporary 
wage subsidy counts toward further UI eligibility.   
The general categories of programs offered in Switzerland mirror those available in other 
developed countries.  With the exception of the wage subsidies for temporary jobs, which 
represent the one unique aspect of the service mix in the Swiss system, Swiss ALMP resembles 
that in Germany quite strongly.  The New Deal for Young People in the United Kingdom also 
provides classroom training, subsidized employment and work experience, where the last of these 
corresponds to the New Deal’s Voluntary Sector and Environmental Task Force options.  The 
Swiss options also resemble those provided as Employment Benefits and Support Measures to 
unemployed persons in Canada.  They are somewhat less similar to the service structure of the 
new U.S. Workforce Investment Act program, given the emphasis in the latter on services related 
to job search, at least as a first step. 
3. Data 
Our data consist of administrative records on all persons who were registered unemployed in 
Switzerland as of December 31, 1997.  Our analysis sample consists of the subsample of this 
population that results from imposing a number of exclusion criteria.  In particular, we keep only 
unemployed persons with the following characteristics: age between 25 and 55 (inclusive), not 
disabled, at least 100 Swiss Francs of past earnings, valid value of mother tongue variable, Swiss 
citizen or foreigner with annual or permanent work permit, not working at home, not a student, 
not an apprentice, unemployed less than one year, no program duration longer than 14 days in 
1997, no employment program (at all) in 1997, and no program start on January 1, 1998 (such a 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
employment within the three years after the previous unemployment spell.   The usual replacement rate in the 
Swiss UI system is 0.70 or 0.80, depending on the recipient’s family status. 
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start date implies a continuing program).4  The analysis sample includes over 19,000 persons, 
which is large enough to allow us to estimate the impacts of particular service alternatives with 
standard errors of reasonable size.  See Gerfin and Lechner (2002) for more details on the 
construction of the analysis sample. 
We code the first major spell of program participation starting after January 1, 1998, where 
we define a major spell of participation as one lasting at least 14 days.  We code persons not 
participating in any single program for more than two weeks between January 1, 1998 and 
January 1, 1999 as non-participants.  In order to code time-varying variables for non-participants, 
we assign each one a random start date drawn from the empirical distribution of start dates 
among participants.  Non-participants whose simulated start date occurs after the end of their 
unemployment spell are dropped from the sample.5 
In coding service receipt, we have to deal with the familiar problem that participants often 
participate in more than one program in a given unemployment spell.  As in other countries, these 
additional programs sometimes represent part of a planned sequence but often represent an 
endogenous response to a poor match between the claimant and the initial program in which he or 
she participates.  In our data, about 30 percent of those participating in at least one program also 
participated in another; however, for the majority of these, the second program was of the same 
type (in the typology shown in Table 1) as the first.  In light of these facts, we follow Gerfin and 
Lechner (2002) by coding persons based on the first program they participate in for more than 
two weeks during a given unemployment spell.  
                                                          
4 See Appendix A.2 of Gerfin and Lechner (2002) for even more detail about the sample definition.  
5 See Lechner (1999), Sianesi (2001) and Fredricksson and Johansson (2002) for discussions regarding the temporal 
alignment of non-participants. 
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4. The Caseworker Allocation 
Currently, Swiss ALMPs rely on caseworkers to assign unemployed persons to employment and 
training services.  In the Swiss system, each caseworker has 75 to 150 persons to work with, and 
the caseworker has an in-depth interview with each client every month.  This represents 
substantially more in person contact than participants would receive in most other developed 
countries.  It also means that Swiss caseworkers have the opportunity to gain a large amount of 
information about the claimant’s needs and abilities, information that, in principle, they should be 
able to use in effectively matching claimants to services.  Given the large amount of information 
they possess about their clients, and given the flexibility present in the highly decentralized Swiss 
system, it could be argued that the performance of Swiss caseworkers in the allocation task 
should represent an upper bound for caseworkers in other developed countries. 
 Table 2 presents information on the allocation chosen by the caseworkers.  The first 
column of Table 2 shows the number of sample observations in each service type.  It reveals 
temporary wage subsidies as the most common service, followed by language courses.  The 
predominance of the latter reflects the over-representation of foreigners among the Swiss 
unemployed.  The second column indicates the mean duration of the program for persons 
receiving each service.  In general, employment-related services tend to last longer than 
classroom-based services.  The third and fourth columns indicate the mean days of 
unemployment prior to the start of services and the fraction of persons for whom the services 
started prior to the 150-day deadline.  The fifth column indicates the mean qualification of 
persons receiving each service type, with qualifications measured on a scale from one (skilled) to 
three (unskilled).  Perhaps not surprisingly, participants in language courses have the lowest 
mean level of qualifications, while participants in computer courses have the highest.  The 
opposite pattern holds in the sixth column, which indicates the percentage of foreigners in each 
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service type.  The highest percentage is now found for language courses, and the lowest for 
computer courses.   
The final column in Table 2 gives employment rates as of March 1999.  The highest 
employment rate corresponds to temporary wage subsidies and the lowest to private employment 
programs.  Of course, these employment rates reflect a combination of non-random assignment to 
services based on employment-related characteristics such as level of qualifications and the 
impact of the services themselves on the probability of unemployment. 
We draw three main lessons from Table 2.  First, Swiss caseworkers are making use of the 
flexibility available to them to assign unemployed persons in large numbers to all of the 
treatment types we consider here.  Second, the caseworkers do not allocate persons at random 
with respect to their observed characteristics.  Mean unemployment durations, mean 
qualifications and percent foreign all differ among the service types.  Assuming that most 
services have only modest impacts (consistent with the survey in Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 
1999, and with our own estimates presented in the next section), there are also strong differences 
in mean employment chances in the absence of treatment across treatment types as well.  Third, 
the caseworker allocation shows evidence of systematic, reasonable patterns.  It makes sense to 
assign foreigners to language courses and the most qualified among the unemployed to computer 
courses, which are presumably among the most challenging courses offered. 
5. Econometric Strategy 
 Our analysis builds in part on the non-experimental impact estimates for the different 
service alternatives presented in Gerfin and Lechner (2002).  Readers interested in a complete 
account of the econometric strategy employed to generate the estimates should refer to that paper.  
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Here we present a shorter, less technical discussion that gives the basics regarding where our 
estimates come from. 
 Let S  denote one of the nine service alternatives, where we define {0,..., }∈ M 0S =  as 
non-participation and note that .  The evaluation problem arises because we observe each 
unemployed person in only one of the nine possible states, and so only observe one of the 
associated nine outcomes, 
8M =
..,0 ,. MY .   Y
 We require estimates of three different parameters of interest in our investigation.  The 
first of these are estimates of the impact of treatment on the treated, given by: 
 , ( | ) ( | ) ( |m l m l m l )E Y Y S m E Y S m E Y S mθ = − = = = − = . (1) 
The second of these are estimated average treatment effects, given by: 
 , ( ) ( ) (m l m l m lE Y Y E Y E Y )γ = − = − . (2) 
The third of these are estimated expected outcome levels in each service alternative for 
unemployed individuals with a particular value of observed covariates X: 
 ( | ) for 0,...,  and .mE Y X x m M x χ= = ∀ ∈  (3) 
 To identify these three parameters of interest, we follow Lechner (2001a) and Imbens 
(2000) and adopt the following multi-treatment version of the conditional independence 
assumption (CIA): 
 0 1, ,..., |MY Y Y S X x⊥ =   x χ∀ ∈ . (4) 
This assumption states that the potential outcomes associated with each service alternative 
(including non-participation) are independent (denoted by  “⊥ ”) of the service alternative choice 
conditional on some set of observed covariates X.  This “data hungry” assumption becomes 
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plausible in our context because of the availability of exceptionally rich data on both unemployed 
individuals and their local economic and programmatic environments.  Given our rich data, we 
argue that we can condition on all of the important factors that affect both the choice of service 
alternative and labour market outcomes.  
 In order to compare unemployed individuals with a given set of values X x=  in two 
different service alternatives, we require that there be a non-zero probability of each service for 
each possible value of X.  Formally, we assume that 
   0 Pr( | )S m X x< = = for 0,...,  and m M x χ= ∀ ∈ . 
This is the so-called common support condition.  In practice, there are two separate conditions, 
one in the population and one in the sample.  Because Gerfin and Lechner (2001) show that only 
a small fraction of the sample gets dropped due to imposition of the support condition, and 
because we will switch to a parametric model in Section 7, we do not impose the support 
condition in our analysis here.  See Lechner (2001b) and, e.g., Smith and Todd (2003) for further 
discussions of the support issue. 
 In addition to the CIA, we also assume that the outcomes for each person, Y , do 
not depend on the distribution of the population among the different service alternatives.  Put 
differently, we assume the absence of spillovers or general equilibrium effects.  The formal name 
for this assumption in the literature is the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption, or SUTVA.  
It is common to all partial equilibrium analyses, including those using matching methods.  This is 
a strong assumption in our context.  Assigning all of the unemployed to, say, vocational training, 
would raise the quantity of labour with certain skills, and thereby likely depress its price, relative 
to a situation in which only a modest fraction of the unemployed receive such training.  This is 
one reason, the other being the practical difficulties (supply constraints) associated with rapid 
0 ,...,i YMi
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changes in the distribution of service types, that our analyses consider allocations that do and do 
not impose the current distribution of service types as a constraint. 
 The multi-treatment CIA justifies using a matching estimator to estimate the parameters 
of interest in (1) and (2) (and (3), although we do not do so here).  As is well known, matching 
directly on X leads to the so-called “curse of dimensionality”.  Following Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983), as generalized for the multi-treatment context by Lechner (2001a) and Imbens (2000), we 
use balancing scores for our matching estimates.   The balancing score combines marginal 
probabilities of each service alternative conditional on X estimated in a multinomial probit with a 
short vector of Xs to which we want to assign greater weight than they implicitly receive by being 
included (as they are) in the estimated probabilities.6  Gerfin and Lechner (2002) describe the 
multinomial probit estimation in greater detail.  The Mahalanobis distance serves as the distance 
metric for single nearest neighbour matching with replacement. 
 As discussed in Gerfin and Lechner (2002), an important issue that arises in implementing 
the matching estimator concerns how to compute the estimated standard errors.  The usual way to 
construct standard errors for estimates based on matching is by bootstrapping.  In this context, 
estimation of the multinomial probit takes long enough that obtaining sufficient bootstrap 
replications becomes infeasible.  Lechner (2002a) suggests an estimator of the asymptotic 
standard errors for the treatment on the treated ( ,m lθ ) and average treatment effect ( ,m lγ ) 
parameters.  His estimator assumes that the variance component resulting from the estimation of 
the probabilities themselves in the first step multinomial probit is sufficiently small that it can 
safely be ignored.  The comparison presented in Lechner (2002b) between these approximate 
standard errors and bootstrap standard errors utilizing the same data we utilize for this paper finds 
                                                          
6 The set of Xs included on their own in the balancing score includes native language not a Swiss language, sex, the 
calendar date of program start, and the duration of the unemployment spell prior to program start. 
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only a small difference between the two.  Thus, where we report standard errors, they rely on the 
procedure outlined in Lechner (2002a). 
 Table 3 presents various quantiles of the distributions of marginal probabilities that result 
from the multinomial probit.  The table yields some interesting findings.  First, there are very few 
extremely high probabilities.  The highest value of the 99th percentile is 65.1 percent for non-
participation, while the lowest is 0.1 percent for further vocational training.  Second, our model 
produces a substantial amount of differentiation for all nine of the service alternatives.  The 
variables included in the model clearly do predict participation, not just in some cases, but in all 
cases.  Finally, the distributions reflect the underlying unconditional probabilities.  The 
distributions for services received by only a small fraction of the population are clearly 
stochastically dominated by those for services (or no service, in the case of non-participation) 
received by a larger fraction of the population. 
6. Does the Caseworker Allocation Maximize Employment Rates? 
In this section, we utilize the non-experimental impact estimates from the multi-treatment 
matching procedure to examine how well the caseworker allocation does at maximizing the ex 
post employment rate of the Swiss unemployed in our sample.  Put differently, and putting aside 
both cost considerations and longer-term impacts for the moment, we consider whether the 
caseworker allocation serves the goal of efficiency in service allocation. 
 We begin with Table 4, which presents estimates of the impact of treatment on the treated, 
,m lθ .  The outcome variable is employment status 365 days after the start of the program.  For the 
participants in each treatment, the estimates in Table 4 indicate which treatment (including 
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possibly the one they received or no treatment at all) our estimates indicate would have yielded 
the highest post-program employment rate.  To see how this works, consider the first row of 
Table 4, labelled “NONP”, for non-participation.  The shaded value of 41.3 indicates that the 
observed employment rate for the non-participants one year after their simulated start date is 41.3 
percent.  The remaining entries in the first row indicate the estimated difference in employment 
rates that the non-participants would have experienced had they received the service in the 
corresponding column.  Thus, we estimate that the non-participants would have had an 
employment rate of 31.4 (= 41.3 – 9.9) had they undertaken basic courses.  Overall, our analysis 
indicates that the non-participants would have achieved a higher employment rate than they 
actually did in only two of the eight services: “other training” and temporary wage subsidy.  The 
value of 7.3 for the temporary wage subsidy is highlighted to indicate that it is the alternative 
yielding the highest employment rate in the row.  Similarly, the value of -9.9 for basic courses 
appears in italics to indicate that this alternative yields the lowest estimated employment rate for 
the individuals in the non-participant row.  The lower panel of Table 4 presents estimated 
standard errors for the estimates in the upper panel. 
 What general conclusions emerge from Table 4?  In every row, and thus for the 
individuals assigned to each of the nine services we examine, some other service would yield a 
higher estimated employment rate.  Indeed, our estimates suggest that if maximizing post-
program employment rates were the goal, then everyone should have received either “other 
training” or a temporary wage subsidy.  Perhaps surprisingly, our estimates suggest that those 
who actually received either one of these two services would have had a higher probability of 
employment, had they received the other!  In most cases, the implied difference in employment 
rates between the service assignment with the highest employment rate and the employment rate 
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corresponding to the service actually received exceeds 10 percentage points; in two of the 
remaining three cases, it exceeds five percentage points.   
 Things are not as bad as they could be, however.  In only one case – basic courses – is the 
estimated employment rate lowest for the service actually received.  Basic courses have the 
lowest estimated employment rate for individuals receiving all but two of the available services.  
In every case other than basic services, the observed employment rate for the service actually 
received lies more or less in the middle of the distribution of estimated employment rates 
associated with the other services.  Taken as a whole, the evidence in Table 4 suggests that 
caseworkers do neither very well nor very poorly at allocating workers to services relative to the 
goal of maximizing their post-program employment rate. 
 Having established in Table 4 that caseworkers do not appear to allocate the unemployed 
to alternative services in a way that maximizes their post-program employment rate overall, we 
set a somewhat lower standard in Table 5.  In Table 5, we ask whether the individuals with a very 
high probability (in the top quintile in our sample) of being assigned to each particular alternative 
achieve the highest estimated post-program employment rate in that service.  The idea here is that 
caseworkers seem to agree about what to do with individuals with sets of characteristics that lead 
them to have very high probabilities of assignment to particular services.  This agreement 
suggests that it is for these individuals that caseworkers believe they have the best knowledge of 
the correct alternative.  Table 5 aims to evaluate that knowledge. 
 Table 5 has the same format as Table 4, with observed employment rates on the diagonal 
of the top panel, treatment on the treated impact estimates in the remaining cells of the top panel, 
and estimated standard errors for the elements of the top panel presented in the bottom panel.  
Thus, we see that for those whose probabilities of non-participating lie in the upper quintile in 
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our sample, the observed employment rate is 33.4.  Comparing this value to the corresponding 
element in Table 4, we learn that persons with high probabilities of being non-participants have 
lower employment rates than all those who actually do not participate.  We estimate that 
individuals with high probabilities of being non-participants would have had substantially higher 
employment probabilities (49.5 = 33.4 + 16.1) if they had received temporary wage subsidies.  At 
the same time, we estimate that they would have had much lower employment probabilities (21.8 
= 33.4 – 11.6), had they received basic courses.   
 Overall, we find that in no case are those with a high probability of receiving a particular 
service estimated to have their highest probability of employment in that service.  At the same 
time, in only one case do those with a high probability of receiving a particular service have their 
lowest estimated probability of employment in that service.  Overall, the story parallels that in 
Table 4, and indicates that even when case workers generally agree regarding what service 
someone should receive based on their observable characteristics, they do not do a very good job 
of assigning them to services that will maximize their post-program employment rate. 
 Finally, Table 6 presents a third way of looking at the current allocation of the Swiss 
unemployed to alternative services in our data.  The values in the table consist of the difference in 
the corresponding values in Tables 5 and 4.  Basically, the question addressed here is, do the 
caseworkers do a better job of allocating the persons with a high probability of allocation to a 
particular service than they do in general.  Put differently, while Table 5 addresses the absolute 
quality of the allocation for those with a high probability of allocation to a particular service, 
Table 6 addresses the relative quality of the allocation.  Note that we leave the diagonal elements 
in Table 6 empty; these values combine differences in baseline outcomes with differences in 
assignment quality, and so do not have a clear interpretation. 
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 Evidence of relatively good performance at allocating individuals with high probabilities 
of assignment to a particular service consists of negative estimates of the off-diagonal entries in 
Table 6.  A simple vote count shows negative estimates that 24 of the 72 elements of Table 6.  
This pattern suggests that the caseworkers do not do a better job of assigning persons with high 
probabilities of receiving particular services than they do in general. 
 Taken together, the findings in Tables 4, 5 and 6 clearly indicate that caseworkers either 
do not seek to maximize post-program employment rates when they assign the unemployed to 
alternative services, or else they do try to do so but do not do a very good job of it.  These 
findings suggest the value of looking at alternative allocation schemes based on econometric 
estimates of the employment probability associated with each alternative for each person, 
conditional on observed characteristics.  Such econometric allocation schemes hold the promise 
of higher average post-program employment rates among Swiss ALMP participants. 
7. Alternative Allocation Rules 
 Having established in Section 6 that Swiss caseworkers are not doing an especially good 
job of allocating their unemployed clients so as to maximize their estimated post-program 
employment rates, in this section we consider how a variety of alternative allocation mechanisms 
perform relative to this same standard.  
 Consideration of these alternative participation rules requires the estimation of person-
specific employment probabilities associated with each of the nine service alternatives (including 
non-participation).  The matching estimator described in Section 5 does not estimate such person-
specific probabilities with sufficient precision.  As a result, in this section we proceed in a more 
parametric manner.  In particular, we estimate a binary probit model with employment in day 365 
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as the dependent variable for each of the nine subsamples defined by the observed alternative.  As 
conditioning variables in the probits we include the marginal probabilities of each treatment from 
the multinomial probit model of treatment choice, as well as indices from the multinomial probit 
model (to increase the flexibility of the functional form), along with sex, a Swiss language 
dummy variable, and duration of unemployment up to the participation date.  The specification 
has been tested against omitted variables and functional misspecification using standard score 
tests.  We also performed specification tests against heteroscedasticity, information matrix tests, 
and a normality test.7  These probits allow construction of the conditional probability of 
employment for each sample member in each treatment; it is these conditional probabilities that 
we employ in what follows. 
Five caveats apply to our findings on alternative allocation rules in this section.  First, as 
in our earlier analyses, we continue to assume no scale effects, so that if we allocate, say, all of 
the unemployed to temporary wage subsidies, this does not affect the validity of our estimates.  
Because this represents a fairly strong assumption, we also consider allocation schemes that 
reallocate the unemployed among the various alternative services while keeping the proportion of 
the unemployed assigned to each alternative the same as what we actually observe.  Second, we 
do not have information on direct costs for the different services, so our results rely on estimates 
of gross rather than net impacts.  Our estimates do (partly) capture differences in indirect cost 
savings among alternative services due to reductions in the amount of time spent collecting 
unemployment insurance benefits.   Third, because we condition on functions of X, rather than on 
X itself, in our employment probits, our results understate the ability of the econometric 
assignment models.  Fourth, in contrast to the third caveat, because we take the maxima and 
                                                          
7 Lack of omitted variables, conditional homoscedasticity and normality of the probit latent error terms are tested 
using conventional specification tests (Bera, Jarque, and Lee, 1984, Davidson and MacKinnon, 1984, and White, 
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minima of sets of estimated values to determine assignments with no consideration of the 
variance of these estimates, we overstate somewhat the performance of the econometric 
assignment models.  That is, sampling variation will lead us to over-state the improvement 
associated with assignment rules based on the best or worst predicted outcomes or impacts. 
Fifth, our outcome variable measures employment on one specific day – the day 365 days 
after the start of the program.  If the different service alternatives imply different times paths of 
employment probabilities, then our one-day measure may provide a biased guide to the 
discounted present value of the time spent employed associated with each service (and, likewise, 
to the discounted present value of earnings which would represent the object of interest in North 
American active labour market policy).  In light of these caveats, we view our estimates not as 
definitive statements of expected gains, but rather as suggestive of the improvements that could 
be achieved by supplementing or replacing caseworker judgement with econometric forecasts in 
the allocation of unemployed persons to services. 
 Table 7A presents the employment rates associated with alternative allocations of the 
unemployed workers in our data to the nine available services (including non-participation) we 
consider.  The table includes employment rates for both the full sample of the unemployed, and 
for that sub-sample (about 60 percent) who report as their native language one of the three 
primary Swiss national languages (German, French or Italian).8  This separate analysis allows us 
to determine whether caseworkers do better with the unemployed immigrants who make up the 
non-Swiss language group. 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
1982). The information matrix tests statistics (IMT) are computed using the second version suggested in Orme 
(1988), which appears to have good small sample properties. 
8 The fourth official Swiss language, Romansch, is spoken by only a tiny fraction of the population. 
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 The first two rows of Table 7A present the estimated employment rate given random 
assignment of the unemployed to the nine service alternatives in their existing proportions, and 
the observed overall mean employment rate associated with the caseworker allocation.  These 
two rows provide a succinct summary of the evidence in Tables 4, 5 and 6.  They show that for 
both the full sample and the Swiss language sample, the caseworkers do just a bit worse in their 
allocation than random assignment would do. 
 The next nine rows present the estimated employment rates associated with assigning 
everyone to each of the nine service alternatives in turn.  These allocations have the advantage of 
greatly simplifying the allocation decision, which presumably would save on program 
administration costs.  For five of the service alternatives, assigning everyone to that alternative 
leads to a lower estimated employment rate than either the current caseworker allocation or 
random assignment to services in the existing proportions.  In contrast, in the remaining four 
cases – non-participation, vocational training, other training, and temporary wage subsidies – 
assigning everyone to the service dominates both the caseworker allocation and random 
assignment in terms of our post-program employment rate outcome.  The non-participation case 
holds special interest, as it represents simply getting rid of the active labour market policy.  It 
requires zero direct costs, but still dominates all of the one-service-for-all alternatives other than 
other training and temporary wage subsidies.  This finding is consistent, of course, with the 
general finding in the literature that most active labour market policies do not work very well; 
see, e.g., the survey in Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999). 
 In the next four rows we consider allocations that maximize and minimize the predicted 
employment rate.  These allocations (like the ones that assign all of the unemployed to one 
particular service) relax the constraint imposed by the existing service proportions.  The first of 
the four allocations assigns each person to that one of the nine alternatives for which he or she 
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has the highest predicted employment probability.  The resulting mean post-program employment 
rates of 55.5 overall and 61.9 for the Swiss language sub-sample represent large increases over 
those implied by either random assignment in the existing service proportions or the observed 
caseworker allocation.  The implied distributions of the unemployed among the various services 
for this allocation and for the other three allocations in this group appear in Table 7B.  The 
allocation that maximizes the predicted employment rate assigns far more of the unemployed to 
vocational training, other training and temporary wage subsidies than does the observed 
caseworker allocation, and far fewer to non-participation, basic courses and language courses.   
 The second of the four allocations resembles the first, only it rules out non-participation 
as an alternative (and also drops the non-participants from the sample).  Not surprisingly, given 
that the first allocation assigned only 1.6 percent of the unemployed to non-participation, ruling 
out this option makes little difference to the resulting estimated overall post-program 
employment rate. These two allocations capture the spirit of the Canadian Service Outcomes and 
Measurement System (SOMS) described in Colpitts (2002) and the American Frontline Decision 
Support System (FDSS) described in Eberts, O’Leary and DeRango (2002).  These systems 
sought (in the case of SOMS) or seek (in the case of FDSS) to promote efficiency in allocation 
through the assignment of individuals based on predicted impacts. 
  The next pair of allocations turns the previous pair on its head by assigning individuals to 
that alternative for which they have the lowest predicted probability of employment, with or 
without non-participation included in the set of available options (and non-participants in the 
sample).  These allocations provide worst-case estimates.  We find that allocating services so as 
to minimize the post-program employment rate leads to overall rates of 25.7 percent with non-
participation as an option and 26.7 percent without non-participation as an option.  These figures 
are far below (over 10 percentage points) the employment rates resulting from either the observed 
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caseworker allocation or random assignment with existing service proportions.  This large 
difference reinforces our conclusion from Tables 4, 5 and 6: while the caseworkers are not 
maximizing post-program employment rates, they are not minimizing them either.  Relative to 
the observed caseworker allocation, the allocation that minimizes the estimated employment rate 
assigns more of the unemployed to temporary employment in the public (especially) and private 
sectors, and to language training.  It assigns almost no one to temporary wage subsidies. 
 The final six assignment schemes in Table 7A impose “supply constraints” at either the 
national (in the first three rows in this group) or regional (in the second three rows) level.  By 
supply constraints, we just mean that we force the allocation to adopt the observed distribution of 
services either for the country as a whole or separately for unemployed workers in each region. 
The cantons included in each region for this purpose appear in the notes to Table 7A.  The point 
of imposing these constraints on the allocations we consider is realism; in many cases, there may 
be no way, particularly in the short to medium term, to substantially increase the number of slots 
in computer courses, or to substantially increase the number of temporary wage subsidies which, 
after all, require a willing employer.  By considering both cases of unlimited flexibility (with no 
supply constraints) and no flexibility (where we impose the existing distribution of services) we 
bracket the true situation, which involves some limited amount of flexibility, and more flexibility 
in the amounts of some services than others. 
 The supply constraints raise the problem that who gets assigned to what now depends on 
the order in which we consider the unemployed persons in our data.  Those who get assigned first 
will get their preferred service alternative, but those who get assigned later may find that all the 
slots for their preferred service have already been filled.  We deal with this issue by utilizing the 
following two schemes to order the sample: 
 22
 1. “Effect-based” ordering: First we put our sample in a random order. We then calculate 
for each sample member the estimated mean impact on the probability of post-program 
employment, relative to non-participation, associated with each service alternative, where some 
(or all) of these estimated impacts may be negative.  We then sort the sample members by the 
difference between the most positive (or least negative) impact and the second most positive (or 
least negative) impact.  Assignment to services then proceeds in order by this difference, until 
one service becomes full.  At that point, we reset the estimated impact for the service with no 
remaining slots to a very large negative number (for purposes of the allocation), and the 
unassigned observations are re-sorted.  Allocation then proceeds based on the resorted order until 
a second service becomes full, and so on. 
 2. “Need-based” ordering: First we estimate the probability of employment conditional 
on non-participation for each sample member.  Next we sort the sample based on this probability.  
Then we assign services in order starting with the lowest value of this probability, which we take 
as a measure of need.  That is, we equate need with having a low predicted probability of 
employment in the absence of participation, which is similar in spirit to the allocation mechanism 
used by the Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services system in the United States.  This 
system assigns mandatory employment and training services to new Unemployment Insurance 
benefit recipients with high probabilities of benefit exhaustion or long predicted spells of benefit 
receipt.  See the related chapters in Eberts, O’Leary and Wandner (2002) for details. 
 Separate from the ordering scheme is the choice of which service alternative to assign to 
each person when they come up.  We consider two alternatives here: (1) assignment to the 
alternative with the largest predicted employment rate; and (2) assignment to the alternative with 
the smallest predicted employment rate.  The first represents a best-case assignment that 
maximizes, given the available estimates and subject to the indicated supply constraints, the 
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efficiency of service allocation.  The second is a worst-case scenario, from an efficiency 
standpoint, again given the available estimates and subject to the supply constraints.   
 Now return to the final six assignment schemes in Table 7A.  The first three represent 
assignment to the service with the largest gross impact with effect-based ordering, assignment to 
the service with the smallest gross impact with effect-based ordering and assignment to the 
service with the largest gross impact with need-based ordering, all with supply constraints 
imposed at the national level.  The next three assignments are the same but with the supply 
constraints imposed at the regional level.   
 These six assignments provide several useful lessons. First, comparing the constrained 
and unconstrained allocations based on gross impacts for the full sample, we see that imposing 
the national supply constraints makes a large difference, by reducing the estimated post-program 
employment rate from 55.5 to 49.3.  In contrast, imposing the supply constraints at the regional 
rather than the national level leads to only a small further reduction from 49.3 to 47.2.  Thus, 
supply constraints matter, and without further information about just how elastic the supply of 
subsidized jobs and training slots, the data leave us with a fairly wide range of potential 
employment rates associated with service assignment based on estimated impacts. 
 Second, comparing the estimates based on assignment to the largest and smallest gross 
impacts (with effect-based ordering) shows that imposing the supply constraints moderates the 
difference in estimated employment rates between these best and worst cases, relative to that 
found for the unconstrained case.  In addition to the decrease in the employment rate associated 
with allocation based on the largest predicted impacts, the employment rate associated with 
allocation based on the smallest predicted impacts increases from 25.7 to 37.0 for the full sample 
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when we impose the supply constraints.  The supply constraints strongly limit the number of 
unemployed allocated to either relatively effective or relatively ineffective services.   
 Third, the way in which we order the respondents makes very little difference.  For the 
full sample, switching from effect-based ordering to need-based ordering lowers the estimated 
post-program employment rate from 49.3 to 47.8 with the national supply constraints and from 
48.4 to 47.2 for the regional supply constraints.  In this case, adding an equity dimension to the 
allocation has only a small cost. 
 In Table 8 we consider the same allocations as in Table 7A, but with the estimated 
employment rates broken down into subgroups based on regional characteristics.  The first two 
columns present results for urban and rural regions as defined by the size of the town the regional 
employment office (RAV) is located in. The third, fourth and fifth columns present estimates 
separately for Type I, Type II and Type III RAVs, as defined Atag Ernst and Young Consulting 
(1999).  These types relate to estimated inflow and outflow rates from unemployment for each 
office, conditional on local economic conditions.  Type I RAVs have low inflow rates and high 
outflow rates, Type II RAVs have high inflow rates and high outflow rates and Type III RAVs 
have high inflow rates and low outflow rates.  There are no cantons with low inflow rates and 
low outflow rates.  The final two columns break the cantons down by whether their primary 
language is German, or French or Italian. 
 The patterns observed for the full sample, and for the Swiss language sample, largely 
carry over for all of the subgroups in Table 8.   We note two additional findings of interest.  First, 
the difference between the employment rates implied by the observed caseworker assignment and 
by random assignment remains remarkably stable for the various subgroups.  It varies between 
1.2 (for rural RAVs and Type I RAVs) and 0.0 (for Type II) RAVs.  Caseworkers do not appear 
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to vary very much on a geographic basis in their ability to allocate the unemployed.  Second, the 
gains from moving from caseworker allocation to unconstrained (or constrained) allocation based 
on estimated impacts appears noticeably larger for Type I RAVs, and for primarily German-
speaking cantons.  We do not have a clear explanation for this pattern. 
8. Conclusions 
Most active labour market policies in the developed world feature a variety of different 
employment and training services.  With a few notable exceptions, such as the WPRS system for 
the unemployed in the U.S.9, individuals seeking help in the labour market get allocated to these 
services with the assistance of caseworkers.  
 In this paper, we show, using recent data on the Swiss unemployed, that caseworkers do 
about as well at allocating clients to services as random assignment to services (in their existing 
proportions) when performance consists of employment rates measured one year after the start of 
the program.  By examining allocations based on assigning each person to that service with the 
largest, or smallest gross impact (relative to non-participation), we show that things could either 
be much better, or much worse.  Taking our estimates for the full sample without supply 
constraints, we estimate that assigning individuals to the service with the largest impact would 
raise post-program employment rates by 14.0 percentage points.  At the other end, deliberately 
assigning the unemployed to the service with the lowest predicted impact reduces the estimated 
employment rate for the same group by 15.8 percentage points.  Thus, caseworkers do not add 
much value, but they do not subtract much either, in their role as service allocators. 
                                                          
9 Even WPRS represents only a partial example.  The system uses a statistical treatment rule to assign the 
requirement of mandatory employment and training services to a subset of those collecting unemployment 
insurance, but among those required to receive services, caseworkers help to guide service assignment. 
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 Our findings may seem surprising, particularly to those who have interacted with 
caseworkers confident of their abilities.  Despite this, our findings generally comport with the 
(very) small literature that has examined related questions.  The analysis in Frölich (2001) 
corresponds most closely to the one in this paper.  Frölich (2001) applies statistical treatment 
rules to non-experimental data on Swedish rehabilitation programs and finds large gains relative 
to caseworker assignment.   
 Plesca and Smith (2000) examine caseworker decisions regarding program participation.  
In this context, rather than assigning participants to particular services within a program, 
caseworkers decide who gets any service, rather than none, from among a pool of applicants.  
Plesca and Smith (2000), utilizing the experimental data from the U.S. National Job Training 
Partnership Act Study, find that caseworkers do a bit better on this dimension.  They estimate that 
the gain in employment rates from replacing them with a statistical treatment rule based on 
predicted impacts amounts to a few percentage points. 
 Bell and Orr (2002) report on a study that asked caseworkers which applicants they 
thought would benefit most from the AFDC Homemaker-Home Health Aide program, which 
trained welfare mothers to become home health aides.  This information was collected prior to 
the random assignment of applicants.  By interacting the experimental treatment indicator with 
the caseworkers’ ratings of potential benefits in the impact analysis, they show that caseworkers 
have, essentially, no idea who will benefit more or less from the program.  This suggests, in turn, 
that their choices regarding participation are unlikely to do as well as those of a statistical 
treatment rule based on predicted impacts.10 
                                                          
10  Dehejia (1999) compares a statistical treatment rule for assigning welfare mothers to participate or not in the 
California Greater Avenues to Independence (GAIN) program to either having everyone participate or having no 
one participate.  Consistent with our evidence in Tables 7A and 8, he finds that a statistical treatment rule based 
on predicted impacts dominates all-or-nothing assignments into or out of treatment.  O’Leary, Decker and 
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 What evidence exists, including the evidence presented in this paper, does not make a 
strong case for the abilities of caseworkers at assigning individuals to services within ALMPs.  
Should the governments fire their caseworkers and replace them with statistical treatment rules?  
While the evidence presented here (and elsewhere) is suggestive, some important considerations 
remain unresolved.   
 Consider the Swiss context examined here.  Swiss caseworkers perform a number of 
functions in addition to service allocation.  These include monitoring the unemployed and 
encouraging them to look for work or training, networking with employers to develop 
opportunities for subsidized temporary jobs, keeping abreast of local training opportunities and 
so on.  Our results do not pertain to these other functions, which caseworkers may perform either 
well or poorly. 
 In addition, as we have already noted, our analysis has some limitations that flow out of 
the data we use. First, we lack the cost data necessary to examine allocations based on net rather 
than gross impacts.  Second, our dependent variable consists of employment at a particular point 
in time, rather than discounted sums of future earnings.  Because some treatments may have a 
different path of labour market benefits (or harms) over time, an outcome variable based on one 
specific day may not rank the alternatives correctly for some individuals in some cases.  Third, 
our impact estimates rely, of necessity, on non-experimental data.  While the methods we employ 
have credibility in our context due to the wealth of covariate information available on the 
individual unemployed and their local economic environments, data in which individuals were 
randomly assigned to services would make our analysis even more compelling. 
 
Wandner (2002) provide a similar analysis in the context of bonus payments to individuals collecting 
unemployment insurance who find work early in their spells. 
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 Finally, a decision about how to organize the assignment of the unemployed to services 
requires a full comparison of the benefits and the costs of the alternative methods under 
consideration.  In this paper, we have compared observed mean outcomes under caseworker 
allocation to estimated mean outcomes under various statistical treatment rules.  Caseworkers 
cost money, but so do statistical treatment rules.  In particular, the latter require data collection, 
analysis, programming and so on.  These are not cheap.  At one point in the late 1990s, the State 
of Kentucky shut down its WPRS profiling system because it was cheaper to serve all of its 
Unemployment Insurance claimants than to serve only some and pay the University of Kentucky 
to operate the profiling system. 
The findings here, in addition to their important implications for the question of how best 
to organize active labour market policy, also raise several broader questions, which we note here 
but whose resolution awaits future work.  First, why do caseworkers think they do a good job of 
allocating individuals to services when in fact they do not?  Second, could a system of feedback 
be developed that would allow them to update their beliefs and to learn to do better?  Third, could 
some improved system of initial training allow the caseworkers to do better?  Fourth, would a 
combination of caseworkers and guidance from statistical treatment rules dominate either 
mechanism on its own?  The Frontline Decision Support System under development in the 
United States represents just such a hybrid.  Finally, from a political economy standpoint, who 
benefits when caseworkers fail to maximize the (economic) efficiency of their allocation?  Does 
the failure of casework allocation that we document represent special interests at work, human 
errors of design, or the outcome of a compromise between many competing policy goals? 
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Table 1: Descriptions of programmes 
  
COURSES  Courses must be necessary and adequate with the goal of improving 
individual employment chances; duration varies between one day and 
several months; here a minimum duration of two weeks is required 
BASIC COURSES (BAC) Short courses teach some basic skills not necessarily related to a 
particular occupation (basic programme, courses to promote self-esteem 
and personality, courses for acquiring basic skills) 
LANGUAGE COURSES (LAC) Language courses 
COMPUTER COURSES (COC)  General computer courses, specific computer courses 
FURTHER VOCATIONAL TRAINING (FVT) Business and trade training (up to the level of a vocational degree), 
business and trade training (above the level of a vocational degree), 
manufacturing and technical training (up to the level of a vocational 
degree), and manufacturing and technical training (above the level of a 
vocational degree) 
OTHER COURSES (OTC) Practice firms, practical courses for the young unemployed, courses for 
jobs in the tourism sector, courses for jobs in the health care sector, and 
other courses 
EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMMES Goal: Work practise. These jobs should be as similar as possible to 
regular employment, but they should be extraordinary, i.e. employment 
programmes should not be in competition with other firms. Both public and 
private institutions offer employment programmes. During an employment 
programme the unemployed has to continue his job search and must 
accept any suitable job offer.  Employment programmes usually last for 
six months. 
PUBLIC (TE-PU) Employment programmes within the public sector 
PRIVATE (TE-PR) Employment programmes within the private sector 
TEMPORARY WAGE SUBSIDY (TEMP) The objective of a TEMPORARY WAGE SUBSIDY is to encourage job seekers 
to accept job offers that pay less than their unemployment benefit by 
making up the difference with additional payments. The total income 
generated by this scheme is larger than the unemployment benefit. The 
TEMPORARY WAGE SUBSIDY scheme does not officially belong to the ALMP 
but there is compelling evidence that the placement offices intentionally 
use the subsidies as an active labour market policy instrument. 
Note: We consider only treatments of at least two weeks in duration.  (NONP) denotes non-participation. 
2 
Table 2: Number of observations and selected characteristics of different groups  
Group obs.  duration of 
programme 
unemployment 
before... 
qualifi-
cation  
foreign employ-
ed March 
1999 
 (persons) (mean 
days) 
(mean 
days) 
(share of 
duration < 
150 days) 
(mean) (share 
in %) 
(share 
 in %) 
NONPARTICIPATION                  (NONP) 6918 0 240  1.8 47 39 
BASIC COURSES    (BAC) 1491 46 236 36 1.8 45 32 
LANGUAGE COURSES   (LAC) 1719 71 225 36 2.2 72 29 
COMPUTER COURSES  (COC) 1394 36 214 40 1.3 22 44 
FURTHER VOCATIONAL TRAINING  (FVT) 424 74 231 35 1.6 38 42 
OTHER TRAINING COURSES  (OTC) 497 94 263 23 1.8 43 42 
EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMMES (PUBLIC)  (EP-PU) 1124 153 302 18 1.7 41 28 
EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMMES (PRIVAT)  (EP-PR) 1349 142 299 18 2.0 51 25 
TEMPORARY WAGE SUBSIDY  (TEMP) 4390 114 228 35 1.7 46 48 
Note: Qualification is measured as skilled (1), semiskilled (2), and unskilled (3). 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of marginal probabilities  
 Quantiles  
Group 1 5 25 median 75 95 99 
NONPARTICIPATION                  (NONP) 13.0 18.2 27.5 35.2 43.4 55.8 65.1 
BASIC COURSES    (BAC) 0.9 1.6 4.4 7.4 10.3 15.3 20.3 
LANGUAGE COURSES   (LAC) 0.1 0.5 2.2 5.0 12.2 29.9 45.0 
COMPUTER COURSES  (COC) 0.2 0.6 1.9 5.0 10.7 20.6 27.5 
FURTHER VOCATIONAL TRAINING  (FVT) 0.1 0.2 0.7 1.5 2.8 5.9 10.8 
OTHER TRAINING COURSES  (OTC) 0.2 0.3 0.5 1.7 3.2 7.0 13.1 
EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMMES (PUBLIC)  (EP-PU) 0.1 0.3 1.7 4.0 8.2 16.9 24.3 
EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMMES (PRIVAT)  (EP-PR) 0.2 0.5 2.1 4.7 9.6 21.1 31.5 
TEMPORARY WAGE SUBSIDY  (TEMP) 5.7 9.1 15.8 21.6 28.1 40.0 52.5 
Note: Probabilities in %. 
3 
Table 4: Average potential employment rates one year after the programme starts in %-points 
relative to observed state 
employment 
programme 
Programme (l) 
------------------- 
Population (m) 
Non-
part. 
basic 
courses 
language 
courses 
computer 
courses 
vocat. 
training  
other 
training  
public private 
temporary 
wage 
subsidy 
|lEY S m=  
NONP 41.3 -9.9 -2.8 -3.1 -3.4 4.0 -8.8 -8.9 7.3 
BAC 9.3 35.7 4.4 0.2 11.2 17.7 3.3 0.9 14.2 
LAC 9.4 -3.0 31.1 2.6 12.4 17.2 -11.4 2.2 16.7 
COC 6.8 -12.0 -0.7 45.6 6.4 16.5 0.0 -1.6 9.7 
FVT -3.0 -12.2 4.5 -2.0 44.7 8.4 -12.6 -11.8 10.7 
OTC -4.0 -11.4 -4.6 -7.4 -9.5 44.2 -8.9 -10.0 8.3 
TE-PU 6.8 -4.0 3.8 5.2 10.3 13.1 32.9 5.8 13.7 
TE-PR 7.3 -0.7 -1.4 2.0 -0.4 15.1 -1.1 30.9 19.5 
TEMP -5.7 -16.6 -9.1 -9.7 -2.8 4.6 -16.7 -12.5 51.2 
All (levels) 42.9 32.2 38.8 38.6 42.3 50.0 33.2 35.4 50.0 
standard errors of estimated levels 
NONP 0.7 2.7 2.5 2.9 4.3 4.2 3.3 3.0 1.4 
BAC 1.8 1.5 3.0 3.3 4.6 4.6 3.9 3.4 2.1 
LAC 2.2 3.3 1.3 7.7 9.1 6.2 5.4 4.7 2.6 
COC 1.9 2.9 3.2 1.6 4.1 5.2 4.4 4.2 2.2 
FVT 3.1 3.8 3.9 3.5 2.9 5.7 4.8 4.4 3.2 
OTC 3.1 3.7 4.4 4.7 6.9 2.9 4.3 4.3 3.3 
TE-PU 2.4 3.7 4.0 4.2 5.6 5.4 2.1 3.6 2.6 
TE-PR 2.3 3.2 3.8 4.7 6.1 5.9 3.9 1.9 2.6 
TEMP 1.3 2.6 3.3 3.1 4.6 4.8 3.5 3.2 1.0 
All 0.8 2.1 2.2 2.6 3.8 3.8 2.9 2.6 1.2 
Note:  The employment rate is measured at day 365 after the start of the programme. Results are based on matched samples. 
The value for the treatment with largest expected outcome for the particular population appears in bold and the one 
with the smallest expected outcome appears in italics. 
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Table 5: Average employment rates one year after the programme starts in %-points for 
population most likely to participate in specific programme  
EP Programme (l) 
------------------- 
Population (m) 
Nonpart. BAC LAC COC FVT OT 
public private 
TEMP treated 
obs. 
[ | , ( | ) ]l mE Y S m P S m x a= = >  
NONP 33.4 -11.6 1.1 -7.9 -0.4 -6.6 -1.1 -9.6 16.1  
BAC 10.5 37.5 6.2 -2.6 -0.9 16.8 8.2 -9.0 10.6  
LAC 9.2 -0.9 25.8 3.6 19.6 24.4 -12.8 8.9 22.3  
COC 8.2 -7.2 3.9 48.3 6.8 23.2 2.0 -2.6 14.0  
FVT 5.1 -11.2 5.6 -7.9 45.8 14.7 -18.6 -14.5 12.0  
OTC 4.3 -1.8 5.2 -11.6 -6.1 37.1 8.1 -4.5 10.5  
TE-PU 4.3 8.9 8.9 10.3 4.4 31.4 29.4 4.8 11.8  
TE-PR 8.3 1.7 -1.9 5.6 -1.4 31.4 -2.8 22.9 28.9  
TEMP -3.3 -14.0 -5.6 -7.5 9.0 11.5 -18.4 -1.3 52.2  
standard error of estimate 
NONP 1.2 6.1 4.5 5.3 9.1 7.3 6.4 5.7 2.9 1659 
BAC 3.2 2.6 5.7 6.0 9.1 8.3 7.3 6.1 3.9 344 
LAC 3.0 4.1 1.5 11.3 13.1 9.3 7.3 6.9 3.6 802 
COC 2.7 4.4 4.7 2.1 6.0 8.0 7.4 7.8 3.1 551 
FVT 4.3 5.5 6.1 5.0 3.9 8.3 8.3 7.5 4.5 166 
OTC 4.5 6.2 9.0 8.8 12.8 4.2 8.3 8.2 5.5 132 
TE-PU 4.2 7.9 9.7 9.3 13.1 17.0 3.6 7.1 5.6 163 
TE-PR 3.9 6.4 6.6 10.0 9.5 11.8 7.3 2.8 5.3 227 
TEMP 2.7 6.1 9.6 7.3 9.8 13.4 7.6 8.1 1.8 808 
Note:  The employment rate is measured at day 365 after the start of the programme. Results are based on matched samples. 
The value for the treatment with largest expected outcome for the particular population appears in bold and the one 
with the smallest expected outcome appears in italics. The population in the table is defined as individuals above the 
80th quantile (in the full population) of the distribution of the marginal probability for being in that particular treatment. 
Therefore, the sample in each row is only 20% of the sample used for the estimates presented in Table 4. 
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Table 6: Differences between those people most likely to be allocated to specific programme and 
actual allocation  
EP Programme (l) 
------------------- 
Population (m) 
Nonpart. BAC LAC COC FVT OT 
public private 
TEMP 
NONP - -1.7 3.9 -4.8 3.0 -10.6 7.7 -0.7 8.8 
BAC 1.2 - 1.8 -2.8 -12.1 -0.9 4.9 -9.9 -3.6 
LAC -0.2 2.1 - 1.0 7.2 7.2 -1.4 6.7 5.6 
COC 1.4 4.8 4.6 - 0.4 6.7 2.0 -1.0 4.3 
FVT 8.1 1.0 1.1 -5.9 - 6.3 -6.0 -2.7 1.3 
OTC 8.3 9.6 9.8 -4.2 3.4 - 17.0 5.5 2.2 
TE-PU -2.5 12.9 5.1 5.1 -5.9 18.3 - -1.0 -1.9 
TE-PR 1.0 2.4 -0.5 3.6 -1.0 16.3 -1.7 - 9.4 
TEMP 2.4 2.6 3.5 2.2 11.8 6.9 -1.7 11.2 - 
Note:  Entries in Table 5 minus entries in Table 4. 
6 
Table 7A: Allocation of participants using different assignment rules 
 All Native languages 
'Swiss' 
Assignment Mean  Std. 
error 
Mean  Std. 
error 
Random assignment in existing treatment proportions 42.2  46.9  
Case worker assignment 41.5  46.1  
Assignment of everyone to  NONP 42.9 0.8 46.4 1.1 
    BAC 32.2 2.1 36.9 2.6 
    LAC 38.8 2.2 46.9 3.4 
    COC 38.6 2.6 42.4 2.3 
    FVT 42.3 3.8 47.6 4.1 
    OTC 50.0 3.8 54.2 4.6 
    TE-PU 33.2 2.9 42.6 3.5 
    TE-PR 35.4 2.6 41.1 3.4 
    TEMP 50.0 1.2 53.4 1.4 
Assignment to treatment based on largest predicted gross impact for each 
person 55.5  61.9  
Assignment to treatment based on largest predicted gross impact for each 
person without nontreatment 57.2  63.3  
Assignment to treatment based on smallest predicted gross impact for each 
person 25.7  30.3  
Assignment to treatment based on smallest predicted gross impact for each 
person without nontreatment 26.7  31.0  
Assignment to treatment based on largest predicted gross impact for each 
person imposing national supply constraint – Effect based 49.3  54.8  
Assignment to treatment based on smallest predicted gross impact for each 
person imposing national supply constraint – Effect based 37.0  40.2  
Assignment to treatment based on largest predicted gross impact for each 
person imposing national supply constraint – Need based 47.8  53.6  
Assignment to treatment based on largest predicted gross impact for each 
person imposing regional supply constraint - – Effect based 48.4  54.0  
Assignment to treatment based on smallest predicted gross impact for each 
person imposing regional supply constraint – Effect based 37.5  40.6  
Assignment to treatment based on largest predicted gross impact for each 
person imposing regional supply constraint – Need based 47.2  52.7  
Note: The seven regions used to define the regional supply constraints are defined as follows: (SG, AI, AR, TH, GR, GL, SH), 
(LUZ SZ, UR, OW, NW, ZU), (BE, FR, JU, SO, NB), (WT, WS, GE), (BS, BL, AA), TE, ZR.  “Swiss” languages are 
defined for the current study as German, French and Italian. 
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Table 7B: Allocation of participants to treatments when assignment rules allow a deviation from 
the observed shares 
Assignment NON
P 
BAC LAC COC FVT OTC TE-
PU 
TE-
PR 
TEM
P 
All 
Observed shares 38.8  7.8 10.1 8.1 2.4 2.3 4.1 4.9 21.5 
Assignment to treatment based on largest predicted 
gross impact for each person 1.6  0.02 1.6 6.3 25.2 27.0 2.2 3.1 33.0 
Assignment to treatment based on largest predicted 
gross impact for each person without nontreatment  0.02  1.7 6.4 25.4 27.4 2.2 3.1 33.8 
Assignment to treatment based on smallest predicted 
gross impact for each person 0.9  10.1 16.2 0.7 5.97 3.28 48.2 14.4 0.1 
Assignment to treatment based on smallest predicted 
gross impact for each person without nontreatment  10.2  16.5 0.7 6.2 3.4 48.3 14.5 0.1 
Native languages 'Swiss' 
Assignment to treatment based on largest predicted 
gross impact for each person 1.1 0.01 6.7 3.5 24.5 31.2 2.9 2.0 27.8 
Assignment to treatment based on largest predicted 
gross impact for each person without nontreatment  0.02 7.0 3.1 25.8 33.3 3.0 2.3 25.6 
Assignment to treatment based on smallest predicted 
gross impact for each person 0.5 22.9 5.0 3.0 17.3 7.3 25.0 18.9 0.2 
Assignment to treatment based on smallest predicted 
gross impact for each person without nontreatment  22.9 5.7 2.9 17.2 5.7 25.9 19.5 0.2 
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Table 8: Allocation of participants using different assignment rules - Heterogeneity 
 RAV I RAV II Region (by 
language) 
Assignment Rural Urban Type I Type II Type III Ger F, I 
Random assignment in existing treatment 
proportions 43.6 41.1 45.4 41.1 38.8 45.2 37.9 
Case worker assignment 42.4 40.5 44.2 41.1 38.1 44.9 36.8 
Assignment of everyone to  NONP 44.7 41.1 47.0 41.8 38.6 46.6 38.4 
    BAC 34.5 37.6 35.4 35.1 32.1 37.7 28.2 
    LAC 37.3 34.4 37.4 39.3 32.5 35.5 38.5 
    COC 42.5 42.1 43.4 38.1 41.6 44.5 36.1 
    FVT 46.7 37.2 61.3 37.9 35.6 58.7 28.4 
    OTC 44.0 48.2 52.1 42.1 39.2 56.2 33.8 
    TE-PU 31.0 33.0 41.8 22.5 25.3 36.9 23.9 
    TE-PR 42.6 25.8 43.1 27.2 32.1 39.9 31.4 
    TEMP 50.1 49.6 50.0 51.2 48.6 52.7 45.6 
Assignment to treatment based on largest 
predicted gross impact  60.4 61.1 72.5 61.1 62.7 67.4 54.7 
Assignment to treatment based on largest 
predicted gross impact without nontreatment 61.8 62.2 72.3 61.5 65.3 68.0 55.4 
Assignment to treatment based on smallest 
predicted gross impact  23.8 15.5 25.8 14.1 13.7 28.3 14.7 
Assignment to treatment based on smallest 
predicted gross impact without nontreatment 24.2 16.2 26.1 13.9 14.7 28.4 14.8 
Assignment to treatment based on largest 
predicted gross impact imposing national 
supply constraint – Effect based 
51.6 53.1 55.9 52.5 52.6 52.7 49.0 
Assignment to treatment based on smallest 
predicted gross impact imposing national 
supply constraint – Effect based 
33.3 36.0 35.8 32.3 29.1 38.5 30.2 
Assignment to treatment based on largest 
predicted gross impact imposing national 
supply constraint – Need based 
49.7 51.9 54.2 49.6 49.6 50.8 46.1 
Assignment to treatment based on largest 
predicted gross impact imposing regional 
supply constraint - – Effect based 
50.3 52.0 55.2 51.7 50.6 52.0 48.2 
Assignment to treatment based on smallest 
predicted gross impact imposing regional 
supply constraint – Effect based 
33.9 36.4 36.2 32.3 29.9 39.0 30.5 
Assignment to treatment based on largest 
predicted gross impact for each person 
imposing regional supply constraint – Need 
based 
48.3 50.6 53.7 48.8 48.2 50.2 45.5 
Note:  Types I to III relate to a classification by Atag Ernst and Young Consulting (1999).  
Supply constraints imposed as observed in the specific subgroup considered. 
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Appendix A: Data 
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics 
employment 
programmes 
Variable 
Non-
part. 
basic 
courses 
lan-
guage 
courses 
compu-
ter 
courses 
vocat. 
training 
other 
training 
courses public private 
temp. 
wage 
subsidy 
Number of observations 6918 1491 1719 1394 424 497 1124 1349 4390 
 Days, Years, Swiss Francs 
  Current Unemployment Spell          
Begin of first programme a) 87b) 95 76 80 84 107 135 135 100 
Duration of first programme 0 46 71 36 74 94 153 142 114 
Duration of current unemployment spell 
at begin of programme 
240 236 225 214 231 263 302 299 228 
Remaining time of benefit entitlement at 
start of programme 
339 381 411 410 401 352 336 339 343 
Duration of current unempl., 31.12.97 153 141 149 134 146 156 167 164 128 
Remain. days of „passive regime“, 31.12.97 50 52 53 59 52 43 31 31 52 
Unemployment benefit 125.3 125.2 125.2 124.3 120.3 128.3 124.8 125.0 123.9 
Age in years 38.0 38.4 37.0 38.3 38.1 37.3 39.2 38.5 37.5 
 Proportions in % 
Younger than 30 24 23 26 23 23 27 21 22 25 
Older than 50 11 11 7 13 9 10 14 11 9 
Female 43 46 55 46 33 55 37 39 42 
Number of persons to support 2.21 2.26 2.28 2.22 2.22 2.31 2.23 2.23 2.23 
At least one person to support  61 62 63 63 62 65 62 63 62 
Mother tongue          
German 30 39 9 49 38 33 37 30 35 
French 21 15 13 28 29 21 19 17 19 
Italian 12 8 12 8 7 8 9 13 12 
Not German/French/Italian 37 38 66 15 25 38 36 41 34 
Language spoken in canton of residence 51 52 21 76 67 54 54 50 54 
G/F/I, but not canton language 11 10 13 10 8 8 10 10 12 
  Foreign Languages          
Other Swiss language 64 63 79 54 59 67 64 69 65 
English, Spanish, Portugese 14 13 10 26 20 15 12 9 12 
Other languages 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 
  Marital Status          
Single 26 27 13 35 29 27 30 28 27 
Married 61 59 77 47 58 57 55 58 59 
Widowed 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
Divorced 13 13 8 17 13 15 14 13 13 
Nationality          
Swiss 53 55 28 78 62 57 59 49 54 
Foreign with permanent permit  32 30 39 17 28 23 26 32 31 
Foreign with yearly permit 15 15 33 5 11 20 15 19 15 
Table A.1 to be continued 
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Table A.1 continued 
employment 
programmes 
Variable 
Non-
part. 
basic 
courses 
lan-
guage 
courses 
compu-
ter 
courses 
vocat. 
training 
other 
training 
courses public private 
temp. 
wage 
subsidy 
Qualification          
Skilled 53 54 34 80 63 51 54 43 54 
Semi-skilled 16 15 17 9 18 18 18 16 17 
Unskilled 31 31 49 11 19 31 28 41 29 
Chances to find a job          
No Information 6 5 5 5 4 4 6 4 8 
Very easy 6 4 4 5 5 6 3 5 6 
Easy 14 13 10 19 14 14 13 12 17 
Medium 53 57 54 58 62 57 56 52 56 
Difficult 17 18 25 11 13 15 18 22 12 
Special case 4 3 2 1 2 4 4 5 2 
  Mobility          
Not mobile 12 4 8 8 6 11 5 5 8 
Daily commuter  83 91 88 85 88 84 90 89 88 
Mobile within Switzerland or abroad  5 5 4 7 5 5 5 5 5 
  Looking for ..... job          
Full-time 34 39 43 34 40 35 37 35 38 
Part-time 16 14 12 18 11 16 12 12 12 
No information 49 47 45 49 49 49 51 52 50 
  Unemployment-status          
Full-time 78 81 83 77 85 81 84 81 81 
Part-time 18 16 14 18 11 16 13 15 13 
In part-time employment  2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 4 
Other 2 2 2 3 3 1 2 2 3 
  Monthly earnings in last job          
Less than 1000 2 2 3 4 3 1 2 2 3 
Between 1000 and 2000 11 11 13 12 14 10 11 10 11 
Between 2000 and 3000 25 24 21 22 25 25 24 25 24 
Between 3000 and 4000 27 27 29 27 27 27 27 28 28 
Between 4000 and 5000 20 20 17 17 17 17 19 19 20 
Between 5000 and 6000 8 9 9 9 6 11 9 7 8 
More than 6000 8 7 8 9 8 9 7 8 7 
  Duration of unemployment spell at beginning of programme 
Less than 90 days 18 19 17 18 15 10 6 7 19 
Less than 180Tage 42 44 44 48 44 34 23 24 44 
Less than 270 days 60 62 66 70 65 58 42 44 63 
Less than 365 days 78 80 84 85 81 76 65 66 81 
More than 365 days 22 20 16 15 19 24 35 34 19 
  Job position           
Self-employed 1 0 1 2 1 0 1 1 0 
High (management, etc.) 6 7 3 9 10 4 4 3 5 
Medium 56 52 39 73 60 55 52 46 58 
Low 37 41 58 16 28 41 44 51 37 
Table A.1 to be continued 
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Table A.1 continued 
employment 
programmes 
Variable 
Non-
part. 
basic 
courses 
lan-
guage 
courses 
compu-
ter 
courses 
vocat. 
training 
other 
training 
courses public private 
temp. 
wage 
subsidy 
  Previous occupation          
Agriculture 2 1 2 1 0 1 2 2 2 
Mining 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Food, tobacco 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
Textiles 1 1 4 1 0 0 1 2 1 
Wood and paper 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 2 1 
Chemical 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Metals 7 8 5 6 12 4 6 9 8 
Watches, jewelry 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Health care 3 3 2 3 2 5 3 2 3 
Architecture, engineers 1 2 2 5 5 1 2 1 2 
Construction 8 6 7 3 7 4 9 8 10 
Transportation 4 3 1 2 2 3 4 5 4 
Restaurants 16 14 19 8 7 32 14 15 17 
Printing 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Minerals 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Entrepreneurs, senior officials, justice  4 4 3 5 5 3 2 2 2 
Painting, technical drawing 5 5 5 6 8 2 7 5 8 
Office and computer 14 15 13 28 19 17 14 11 12 
Retail trade 9 11 5 13 15 7 7 6 7 
Security, cleaning, clerical, social work 5 5 9 2 2 5 5 5 5 
Science 2 1 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 
Artist 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 
Education 2 1 1 2 1 2 3 2 3 
News and communication 1 1 1 2 1 0 1 1 1 
Body care 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Other 8 12 13 5 7 6 11 16 8 
  Correspondence between desired and previous job 
2-digit 73 72 70 74 69 67 68 69 75 
3-digit 68 66 65 66 62 60 62 63 69 
  Previous industry sector          
Agriculture 2 1 1 1 0 1 2 2 2 
Mining, energy, water 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Construction 13 10 11 7 14 6 14 11 17 
Public services 11 9 9 9 8 10 10 10 6 
Other services 5 4 4 6 4 6 6 7 5 
Health care  4 3 3 4 3 5 4 3 4 
Research and development 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 
Education 2 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 2 
Banking, insurance 3 3 2 6 5 4 2 1 2 
Real estate 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Consulting 11 11 11 16 12 7 10 11 12 
Transportation 3 3 2 4 4 3 3 3 3 
News and communication 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Trade 15 17 15 19 17 13 15 15 13 
Table A.1 to be continued 
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Table A.1 continued 
employment 
programmes 
Variable 
Non-
part. 
basic 
courses 
lan-
guage 
courses 
compu-
ter 
courses 
vocat. 
training 
other 
training 
courses public private 
temp. 
wage 
subsidy 
Restaurants, catering 15 13 17 8 6 27 11 13 16 
Repairs 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 
Food, tobacco 1 2 2 1 0 1 1 2 1 
Textiles  1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 
Wood, furniture 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 
Paper, paper products 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Printing 1 2 1 3 1 2 1 1 1 
Leather 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Chemical 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Non-ferrous minerals 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Metals 2 3 3 2 6 2 3 4 2 
Machinery and equipment 2 3 3 2 6 2 3 2 3 
Electrical machinery,  optics 2 2 3 2 3 1 2 3 2 
Watches, jewelry 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Other manufacturing 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
Industry unemployment rate in %, 1/98 6.6 6.3 6.8 5.7 5.6 7.5 6.2 6.4 6.7 
  Canton          
Zurich 22 22 27 21 23 18 29 6 18 
Berne 8 10 8 9 5 5 14 14 10 
Lucerne 3 4 5 5 4 8 3 4 3 
Uri 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
Schwyz 0 3 1 1 0 1 2 1 1 
Obwalden 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
Nidwalden 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
Glarus 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 
Zug 1 0 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 
Freiburg 2 6 4 4 2 2 6 2 3 
Solothurn 2 5 2 2 3 1 1 8 4 
Basel-City 4 4 3 4 2 2 2 4 3 
Basel-Landschaft 2 4 2 3 2 1 1 3 2 
Schaffhausen 1 0 1 2 2 0 1 0 1 
Appenzell AR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Appenzell IR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
St. Gall 4 6 9 4 5 5 2 2 5 
Graubünden 2 3 1 2 1 1 0 3 1 
Aargau 5 5 9 4 7 6 1 8 5 
Thurgau 1 1 3 3 1 2 3 1 2 
Ticino 9 2 5 5 4 10 4 12 8 
Waadt 14 15 6 17 19 14 10 13 13 
Wallis 4 3 3 3 5 4 7 7 8 
Neuenburg 4 1 1 2 1 2 7 4 3 
Geneva 12 3 8 9 7 10 3 4 7 
Jura 1 1 0 1 7 1 2 1 1 
Cantonal unemployment rate 5.33 4.72 4.65 5.09 5.19 5.09 5.02 5.16 5.21 
Table A.1 to be continued 
13 
Table A.1 continued 
employment 
programmes 
Variable 
Non-
part. 
basic 
courses 
lan-
guage 
courses 
compu-
ter 
courses 
vocat. 
training 
other 
training 
courses public private 
temp. 
wage 
subsidy 
  Canton language          
German 53 70 74 59 56 58 61 58 58 
French 38 28 21 36 41 32 35 31 34 
Italian 9 2 5 5 4 10 4 12 8 
  Region          
Eastern    8 12 15 10 9 11 7 7 10 
Central  4 7 8 7 6 14 7 7 5 
South-west  31 20 16 29 31 28 21 24 28 
North-west  10 14 14 10 11 8 4 15 11 
West  17 23 16 18 17 10 29 29 20 
  Size of town where worked before 
<1000  8 7 5 9 8 7 8 9 9 
<2000  16 14 11 16 16 15 16 19 18 
<5000  32 31 28 31 34 35 33 37 36 
<10'000  44 45 42 45 47 47 46 51 49 
<20'000  62 62 60 62 65 62 61 68 67 
<30'000  67 66 67 68 72 69 66 76 73 
<50'000  72 70 71 73 74 72 73 80 77 
<100'000  76 76 79 78 80 76 77 84 81 
> 100'000. 24 24 21 22 20 24 23 16 19 
<200'000 . 92 89 89 93 92 90 88 97 94 
> 200'000  8 11 11 7 8 10 12 3 6 
  Region of placement office          
Large city  47 42 42 45 42 36 44 26 38 
Small city 37 36 40 40 42 45 38 52 42 
Rural 15 21 17 14 17 18 17 20 19 
No information 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
  Long-term unemployment in regional placement office 
Inflow to long-term unemployment  c) 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.0 1.9 
Outflow from long-term unemployment d) 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.1 
No information 17 21 18 18 14 16 21 18 21 
  Remaining benefit eligibility          
Less than  6 months 21 16 12 14 13 19 16 17 20 
Less than 12 months 47 38 32 32 36 46 49 50 45 
Less than 18 months 77 69 66 62 71 79 83 82 72 
More than 18 months 17 23 25 28 25 18 12 14 19 
  Unemployment history          
First spell 60 64 70 67 63 57 64 63 57 
Number of spells prior to current spell  0.51 0.45 0.37 0.39 0.47 0.55 0.46 0.46 0.55 
Duration of previous spell / 1000 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08 
Table A.1 to be continued 
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Table A.1 continued 
employment 
programmes 
Variable 
Non-
part. 
basic 
courses 
lan-
guage 
courses 
compu-
ter 
courses 
vocat. 
training 
other 
training 
courses public private 
temp. 
wage 
subsidy 
  Sanction days without  benefit payment 
Number of sanction days during last 
unemployment spell 
4.4 5.0 4.0 3.6 4.7 5.2 4.2 5.2 3.7 
Share in total unemployment spell 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.05 
Positive number of sanction days (in %) 26 25 25 22 25 28 23 26 22 
  Previous programme participation          
Sum of short programs between July and 
December 1997  
0.04 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.06 
Participation in training course or employ-
ment programme between July and 
December 97 (less than 14 days) 
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 
Employment programme before July 97 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 
Training course before  July 97 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 
Temporary wage subsidy before July 97 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 3 
  Employment history from social security data 
Number of months unemployed since 
entry into social security system 
7.6 6.8 5.4 6.4 6.5 6.8 7.9 8.5 6.4 
Number of months employed since entry 
into social security system 
85 86 73 91 90 80 86 82 90 
Number of months out of labour force 
since entry into social security syst. 
15.4 14.8 14.5 14.0 13.0 15.8 14.8 15.8 12.6 
Never unemployed  36 41 49 43 38 39 38 36 40 
Month of entry into social security system 12.1 12.6 27.3 8.7 10.6 17.4 11.6 13.5 11.4 
Number of employment spells 3.53 3.28 2.87 3.03 3.18 3.23 3.44 3.61 3.51 
Number of unemployment spells 1.41 1.26 0.92 1.11 1.24 1.27 1.4 1.51 1.29 
Mean duration of employment spell in 
months  
40 43 39 49 46 39 41 37 43 
Mean duration of unemployment spell e) in 
months 
5.9 5.9 6.5 6.3 5.8 5.7 6.2 6.2 5.3 
Standard deviation of wages / 1000 0.99 0.93 0.78 1.06 1.04 0.88 0.94 0.87 0.94 
Duration of last employment spell 40 43 41 48 46 40 42 38 43 
Wage growth during last employment spell  81 180 106 113 25 148 78 62 69 
Proportion of time unemployed in % 7 6 6 6 6 7 7 8 6 
Proportion of time employed in % 78 79 76 81 81 76 78 76 82 
Notes:   a ) The start of a programme is measured in days since 1.1.98. b) Simulated. 
c)  Mean number of transition into long-term unemployment relative to total unemployment within regional placement of-
fices. d)  Mean number of transitions to employment relative to total unemployment within regional placement offices  
e) This variable takes a value of zero for persons who have never been unemployed before. 
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Appendix B: Estimates of the multinomial probit model 
Table B.1 shows the estimation results of a multinomial probit model (MNP) using simulated 
maximum likelihood with the GHK simulator.1 Although fully parametric, the MNP is a flexible 
version of a discrete choice model, because it does not require the Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives assumption to hold.2 
The variables included in the MNP are selected by a preliminary specification search based on 
binary probits (each relative to the reference category NONPARTICIPATION) and score tests against 
omitted variables.  Entries for variables excluded from a particular choice equation show a “0” 
for the estimated coefficient and “-“ for the standard error. Based on this procedure, the final 
specification contains a varying number of mainly discrete variables that cover groups of 
attributes related to personal characteristics, valuations of individual skill and chances on the 
labour market as assessed by the placement office, previous and desired future occupations, and 
information related to the current and previous unemployment spell, and to past employment and 
earnings.  
In practice, some restrictions on the covariance matrix of the errors terms of the MNP need to be 
imposed, both because not all elements of the covariance matrix are identified and to avoid 
excessive numerical instability.  Guided by considerations of similarity of options and sample 
size, we allowed for free correlations between COMPUTER COURSES, FURTHER VOCATIONAL 
TRAINING, LANGUAGE COURSES and BASIC TRAINING, as well as between EMPLOYMENT 
PROGRAMME (PUBLIC), EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMME (PRIVATE), and TEMPORARY WAGE SUBSIDY. 
Furthermore, the variance of the error term related to TEMP is not restricted (for details see Table 
B.2). 
                                                          
1  See for example Börsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou (1993) and Geweke, Keane and Runkle (1994). 
2  This section is taken from Gerfin and Lechner (2001). 
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Table B.1: Estimated coefficients of a multinomial probit model for participation in a programme 
employment 
programme 
Variable 
Basic 
courses 
language 
courses 
computer
courses 
vocat. 
training 
other 
training 
public private 
temporary 
wage 
subsidy 
Age in years / 10 0.06 0 0 0 0 0.11 0.12 0 
Older than 45 0 -0.11 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Female 0.10 0.20 -0.11 -0.55 0.09 -0.16 -0.20 0.15 
Marital status married 0 0 -0.19 0 0 -0.19 -0.23 0 
Marital status divorced 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.12 
Number of persons to support 0 0.03 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  Mother tongue 
French 0 1.13 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Italian 0 0.74 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Not German/French/Italian 0 1.18 -0.47 -0.57 0 0 0 -0.31 
GF/I, but not canton language 0 0.39 0 -0.65 0 0 -0.13 -0.11 
  Foreign Languages 
Other Swiss language 0 0.15 0.24 0 0 0.08 0.12 0.14 
English, Spanish, Portuguese 0 0.27 0.42 0 0 0 0 0 
  Looking for ... job (reference category: no information) 
Full-time 0 0.09 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Part-time 0 -0.13 0 0 0 0 0 -0.21 
  Unemployment-status (reference category: part-time) 
Full-time 0.31 0.24 0.09 0.49 0.32 0.44 0.29 0.22 
In part-time employment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.26 
  Nationality (reference category: Swiss) 
Foreign with permanent permit 0 0 -0.50 0 -0.20 -0.22 0 0 
Foreign with yearly permit 0 0 -0.74 0 -0.12 -0.13 0.07 0 
  Monthly earnings in last job (reference category: between 2000 and 6000) 
Less than 2000 0 0 0.24 0.39 0 0 0 0 
More than 6000 -0.15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  Chances to find a job (reference category: medium) 
No information -0.13 -0.09 -0.16 -0.35 -0.19 -0.25 -0.33 0.13 
Very easy 0.07 -0.17 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.16 -0.27 -0.06 
Easy -0.03 -0.17 0.11 -0.28 -0.03 -0.16 -0.14 0.11 
Difficult -0.05 0.12 -0.25 -0.36 -0.16 -0.09 0.02 -0.34 
Special case -0.14 -0.24 -0.79 -0.93 -0.08 -0.20 -0.04 -0.87 
  Qualification (reference categories: semi-skilled, unskilled) 
Skilled 0 -0.15 0.62 0 0 0 0 0 
  Previous industry sector (reference categories: agriculture, mining/energy/water, other services, health care, education, bank-
ing/insurance, real estate, transportation, news and communication, trade, repairs, food/tobacco, textiles, wood/furniture, 
paper/paper products, leather, chemical, non-ferrous minerals, machinery and equipment, electrical machinery/optics, 
watches/jewelry, other manufacturing) 
Construction -0.16 0 0 0 -0.31 0 -0.36 0 
Public services 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.33 
Consulting 0 0 0.32 0 -0.17 0 0 0 
Restaurants, catering 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.37 0 
Printing 0 0 0.73 0 0 0 0 0 
Metals 0 0 0 0.86 0 0 0 0 
Industry unemployment rate in %, 1/98 -0.08 -0.06 -0.32 -0.68 0.03 -0.18 0.15 0.05 
Table B.1 to be continued 
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Table B.1 continued 
employment 
programme 
Variable 
Basic 
courses 
language 
courses 
computer
courses 
vocat. 
training 
other 
training 
public private 
temporary 
wage 
subsidy 
  Job position function (reference category: assistant) 
Self-employed 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.61 
High (management, etc.) 0 0 0.28 0 -0.24 -0.41 -0.45 0 
Medium 0 0 0.40 0 0 0 -0.13 0 
  Previous occupation  (reference categories: mining, wood and paper, chemical, minerals, artist) 
Agriculture 0 -0.18 -0.79 -2.19 0 0 0 0 
Food, Tobacco 0 -0.46 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Textiles 0 0.40 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Metals 0 -0.31 -0.20 0.72 0 -0.29 0 0 
Health care 0 0 0 0 0.45 0 0 0 
Architecture, engineer 0 0.32 0.84 1.74 0 0 0 0 
Construction -0.09 -0.24 -0.72 0 0.00 0 -0.03 0 
Transportation 0 -0.59 -0.36 -0.79 0 0 0 0 
Restaurants 0 -0.12 0 0 0.42 0 0 0 
Printing 0 -0.84 0 0 0 0 0 -0.57 
Entrepreneurs, senior officials, justice 0 0 0 0 0 -0.36 -0.38 -0.76 
Painting, technical drawing 0 0 0 0.75 0 0 0 0.20 
Office and computer 0 0.22 0.50 0.82 0.31 0 0 -0.25 
Retail trade 0.15 0 0.36 1.10 0 -0.19 -0.17 -0.33 
Security, cleaning, clerical, social work 0 0 -0.63 0 0 0 0 0 
Science -0.40 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.49 
Education 0 0 -0.84 0 0 0 0 0 
News and communication 0 0 0.87 0 0 0 0 0 
Body care 0 -1.55 -0.99 0 0 -1.16 -0.96 0 
Other 0.15 0 0 0 0 0 0.21 0 
Desired = previous job, 3-digit 0 0 -0.14 -0.33 -0.14 0 0 0 
  Additional regional effects by canton 
Berne -0.49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Lucerne 0 0 0 0 -1.08 0 0 0 
Schwyz 0.99 0 0 0 -1.08 0.70 0 0 
Glarus 0 0 0 0 1.52 0 0 0 
Zug -1.55 0 0 0 -1.99 0 0 0 
Freiburg 0.51 0 0 0 0 0.24 0 0 
Solothurn 0 0 0 0 0 -0.91 0.41 0 
Basel-City -0.51 -0.28 0 0 0 0 -0.56 -0.23 
St. Gall 0 0 0 0 0 -0.61 -0.87 0 
Graubünden 0 0 0.87 0 0 -1.45 0 -0.46 
Aargau -0.25 0.55 -0.90 0 0 -0.41 0 -0.20 
Thurgau 0 0 0.73 0 0 0.43 0 0 
Ticino 0.25 -0.44 -1.45 -2.17 0.09 -0.28 1.65 -0.08 
Waadt 0 -0.53 0 0 0 -0.66 -1.00 -0.51 
Neuenburg -0.79 -1.15 -1.01 -1.86 0 0 0 -0.50 
Geneva -1.20 -0.41 -0.25 -0.70 0 -1.47 -1.83 -0.68 
Jura -0.59 -0.64 0 3.67 0 0 0 -0.75 
Cantonal unemployment rate -0.28 -0.01 0.28 0.38 -0.06 -0.08 -0.28 -0.02 
Table B.1 to be continued 
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Table B.1 continued 
employment 
programme 
Variable 
Basic 
courses 
language 
courses 
computer
courses 
vocat. 
training 
other 
training 
public private 
temporary 
wage 
subsidy 
  Region (reference category: Zurich)         
Eastern  0.09 0.31 0.28 0.14 0.03 0.09 0.64 0.38 
Central 0.19 0.41 0.88 0.61 1.76 0.20 0.81 0.10 
South-west  0.96 -0.44 -0.99 -0.86 0.24 0.57 2.14 0.60 
North-west  0.40 -0.12 0.48 -0.04 -0.02 -0.37 0.94 0.29 
West  0.69 0.01 0.03 -0.57 -0.11 0.37 1.01 0.34 
  Size of town where worked before (reference categories: <100'000, <50'000, <20'000, <10'000) 
>200'000 0.28 0 -0.64 0 0.37 0 0 0 
<30'000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.13 
<5000 0 0 0 0 0 0.10 0 0 
<2000 -0.09 0 -0.18 0 0 0 0 0 
  Region of placement office  (reference categories: small city, no information) 
Large city  0 0 0 0 -0.31 0 -0.16 0 
Rural 0 0 -0.42 0 0 0 0 0 
  Long-term unemployment in regional placement office      
Inflow to long-term unemployment  0 0 4.29 0 0 0 2.65 0 
Outflow from long-term unemployment  0 0 4.81 0 0 0 3.93 0 
No information 0 0 1.59 0 0 0 0.99 0 
  Sanction days without benefit payment 
Number of sanction days during last 
unemployment spell 
0 -0.07 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Positive number of sanction days (in %) 0 0.07 -0.24 0 0 0 0 -0.11 
  Unemployment history         
First spell 0.14 0 0.23 0 0 0.11 0.17 0 
Number of spells prior to current spell 0 -0.17 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  Previous programme participation         
Sum of short programs between July 
and December 1997 
0.15 0 0.42 0.72 0.26 0 0.12 0.08 
Employment programme before July 97 0 0 0 0 0 0.44 0 0 
Temporary wage subsidy before July 
97 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.53 
Begin of programme / 100 0.22 0.05 0.12 -0.00 0.20 0.36 0.38 0.37 
  Duration of unemployment spell at beginning of programme 
Duration (days) -0.02 -1.20 -1.40 -1.00 -0.19 -0.88 -0.56 -2.88 
Less than 90 days 0.03 -0.15 -0.33 -0.46 -0.27 -0.47 -0.28 -0.14 
Less than 180 days 0.11 0 0 0 -0.15 -0.27 -0.39 -0.17 
Less than 270 days 0 0 0 0 0.15 -0.15 0 -0.18 
Less than 365 days 0.21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Remaining days of ″passive regime″ on 
31.12.97 
0 0 0.30 0 0 0 0 -0.12 
Table B.1 to be continued 
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Table B.1 continued 
employment 
programme 
Variable 
Basic 
courses 
language 
courses 
computer
courses 
vocat. 
training 
other 
training 
public private 
temporary 
wage 
subsidy 
  Employment history from social security data 
Never unemployed 0 0 0.34 0 0 0 0 0 
Month of entry into social security system 0 0.84 0 0 0.29 0 0 0 
Mean duration of employ. spell in months 0 0.16 0 0 0 0 -0.19 0 
Mean duration of unemploy. spell in months 0 2.14 4.28 0 0 0 0 0 
Standard deviation of wages / 1000 -0.15 -0.15 -0.14 -0.07 -0.19 -0.19 -0.25 -0.13 
Proportion of time unemployed, in % -0.13 -1.62 -1.63 -1.51 -0.58 0.45 0.62 -0.67 
Proportion of time employed, in % 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.79 
Note: Simulated maximum likelihood estimates using the GHK simulator (100 draws in simulator for each observation and 
choice equation). Coefficients of the category NONPARTICIPATION are normalised to zero. All equations include a con-
stant. Inference is based on the outer product of the gradient estimate of the covariance matrix of the coefficients ig-
noring simulation error. N = 19603. Value of log-likelihood function: - 31744.08.  
Bold numbers indicate significance at the 1% level (2-sided test), numbers in italics relate to the 5% level.  
If not stated otherwise, all information in the variables relates to the last day in December 1997. 
Table B.2: Estimated covariance and correlation matrices of the error terms in the multinomial 
probit model 
employment 
programmes 
 Nonpart. basic 
courses 
language 
courses 
computer 
courses 
vocat. 
training 
other 
training  
public private 
temporary 
wage 
subsidy 
 Coef t-val coef t-val coef t-val coef t-val coef t-val coef t-val coef t-val coef t-val coef t-val 
Covariance matrix a) 
NONP 1  0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 
BAC   1  -0.19 0.17 -0.78 0.58 -0.27 1.63 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 
LAC     1.04  -1.61 0.64 -0.50 1.23 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 
COC       4.71  -1.44 1.59 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 
FVT         8.24  0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 
OTC           1  0 - 0 - 0 - 
TE-PU             1  0.53 0.22 0.04 0.24 
TE-PR               1.28  -0.29 0.25 
TEMP                 2.19 1.85 
Correlation matrix a)  x 100 
NONP 100  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  
BAC   100  -19  -36  -9.6  0  0  0  0  
LAC     100  -73  -17  0  0  0  0  
COC       100  -23  0  0  0  0  
FVT         100  0  0  0  0  
OTC           100  0  0  0  
TE-PU             100  47  2.9  
TE-PR               100  -17  
TEMP                 100  
Note: a)  10 Cholesky factors are estimated to ensure that the covariance of the errors remains positive definite. t-values 
refer to the test whether the corresponding Cholesky factor is zero (off-diagonal) or one (main-diagonal).  
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Table B.3: Correlations of predicted probabilities  
employment 
programme 
 Nonpart. basic 
courses 
language 
course 
computer 
course 
vocat. 
training  
other 
training  
public private 
temporary 
wage 
subsidy 
NONP 1 -0.33 -0.21 -0.10 -0.09 -0.05 -0.28 -0.31 -0.32 
BAC  1 0.03 0.07 0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.15 
LAC   1 -0.26 -0.17 -0.02 -0.23 -0.16 -0.31 
COC    1 0.39 -0.07 -0.13 -0.29 -0.13 
FVT     1 -0.09 -0.03 -0.13 -0.12 
OTC      1 -0.03 0.02 -0.19 
TE-PU       1 0.20 -0.04 
TE-PR        1 -0.05 
TEMP         1 
 
